

Treatment Effects and Difference-in-Differences

Everything You've Learned, Applied to Policy

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Outline

- 1 The Problem: Did the Policy Work?
- 2 Treatment Effects: The Basic Framework
- 3 Difference-in-Differences
- 4 DiD as a Regression
- 5 The Parallel Trends Assumption
- 6 DiD with Panel Data
- 7 The Full Picture: Everything Connects

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\implies We need a strategy that isolates the policy effect from everything else changing at the same time.

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⇒ We need a **control group** that experienced the same time trends but *not* the policy change.

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$\implies \beta_2$ is the **treatment effect**: the average difference in y between treated and control.

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For $E(b_2) = \beta_2$, we need $E(\bar{e}_1) = E(\bar{e}_0)$: all other factors must be equal on average across groups.

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Here \bar{e}_1 is the average unobserved health factor for those who visit and \bar{e}_0 is the average for those who do not. When $E(\bar{e}_1 - \bar{e}_0) \neq 0$, the simple difference estimator is biased. This is **selection bias**.

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\implies Random assignment eliminates selection bias by ensuring $E(\bar{e}_1) = E(\bar{e}_0)$.

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But we still have the time-trend problem. PA employment also changed between February and November. We need a method that accounts for this.

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First difference (within each group over time):

- Control change: $\bar{y}_{C, \text{After}} - \bar{y}_{C, \text{Before}}$ (time trend only)
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Second difference (difference of the differences):

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⇒ The time trend cancels, leaving only the **treatment effect**.

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
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
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Employment in NJ *increased* by about 2.75 FTE relative to PA.

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From the 2×2 Table to a Regression

The DiD estimate can be obtained from a single regression:

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This uses everything you already know:

- NJ_i : an **indicator variable** (Topic 19)
- After_t : another indicator variable
- $\text{NJ}_i \times \text{After}_t$: an **interaction term** (Topic 16)

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⇒ DiD is not a new technique. It is a regression with two dummies and their interaction.

What Each Coefficient Means

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Write out the regression function for each cell:

	After = 0	After = 1
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- $\beta_1 = 23.33$: PA mean before (reference cell)
- $\beta_2 = -2.89$: NJ was 2.89 FTE *below* PA before the policy
- $\beta_3 = -2.17$: PA employment fell by 2.17 (time trend)
- $\delta = 2.75$: the **treatment effect** (DiD estimator)

Verifying: δ Recovers the DiD Formula

From the table of regression functions:

NJ change:

$$(\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \delta) - (\beta_1 + \beta_2) = \beta_3 + \delta$$

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You can test $H_0: \delta = 0$ with a standard t -test. In Card and Krueger's data: $t \approx 1.63$, $p \approx 0.10$ (two-sided). We fail to reject at the 5% level. A two-sided test is appropriate here because the minimum wage could plausibly raise or lower employment.

Adding Controls

Just like any regression, we can add control variables:

$$y_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{NJ}_i + \beta_3 \text{After}_t + \delta (\text{NJ}_i \times \text{After}_t) + \gamma_1 \text{KFC}_i + \gamma_2 \text{Roys}_i + \gamma_3 \text{Wendys}_i + e_{it}$$

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⇒ Adding controls can improve precision and test robustness, just as in multiple regression (Topic 13).

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Formally:

$$E(y_{T,After}^{(0)}) - E(y_{T,Before}) = E(y_{C,After}) - E(y_{C,Before})$$

where $y_{T,After}^{(0)}$ is the **counterfactual** outcome for the treatment group.

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This is the **parallel trends assumption** (also called **common trends**).

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
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
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The levels can differ. The trends must be the same.

When Parallel Trends Hold




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


Before treatment, both groups follow the same trend (the lines are parallel). After treatment, the

When Parallel Trends Fail




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In Card and Krueger’s case: NJ and PA are neighboring states with similar fast-food markets. The assumption is plausible, though debated.

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- 2 Treatment Effects: The Basic Framework
- 3 Difference-in-Differences
- 4 DiD as a Regression
- 5 The Parallel Trends Assumption
- 6 DiD with Panel Data**
- 7 The Full Picture: Everything Connects

Using Panel Data: First Differencing

Card and Krueger observed 384 restaurants in *both* periods. With panel data, we can control for unobserved restaurant-specific characteristics:

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⇒ This is the same idea as the fixed effects estimator (previewed here, covered fully in Econ 104).

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DiD Uses Your Entire Toolkit

Tool	Topic	Role in DiD
Indicator variables	19	NJ_i and $After_t$
Interaction terms	16	$NJ_i \times After_t$
Interpreting coefficients	14	What $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \delta$ mean
Hypothesis testing	10, 17	t -test on δ ; F -test for controls
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⇒ Policy evaluation is not a separate topic. It is the application of every regression concept you have learned this quarter.

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Summary

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Econ 104 extends these ideas to settings where standard OLS breaks down:

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⇒ You now have the foundation for all of it.

Thank you!

Good luck on the final.

jakeanderson@g.ucla.edu